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This paper studies the delegation of activities that pose serious risks to health and the 
environment in an economy regulated by strict liability schemes. Strict liability induces 
judgment-proof possibilities. Two civil liability regimes are then compared: a strict liability 
scheme and a capped strict liability one. The argument is led under a twofold asymmetric 
information assumption between the principal and the agent: the efficiency level in effort for 
safety and the agent’s level of wealth. The paper shows that standard strict liability under 
information asymmetries deters the efficient agent to compete and favors adverse selection. 
Then, under conditions, a capped strict liability regime is a better regime than a standard 
strict liability one because it induces the efficient agent to supply the level of safety effort 
equivalent to the first best solution. The counterpart is the perception of an informational 
rent by the efficient agent. At the optimum, this rent is minimized by the efficient contract 
supplied by the principal. 
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This paper studies the delegation of activities that pose serious risks to health and the 
environment  in  an  economy  regulated  by  strict  liability  schemes.  Strict  liability  induces 
judgment-proof possibilities. Two civil liability regimes are then compared: a strict liability 
scheme and a capped strict liability one. The argument is led under a twofold asymmetric 
information assumption between the principal and the agent: the efficiency level in effort for 
safety and the agent’s level of wealth. The paper shows that standard strict liability under 
information asymmetries deters the efficient agent to compete and favors adverse selection. 
Then, under conditions, a capped strict liability regime is a better regime than a standard 
strict liability one because it induces the efficient agent to supply the level of safety effort 
equivalent to the first best solution. The counterpart is the perception of an informational rent 
by the efficient agent. At the optimum, this rent is minimized by the efficient contract supplied 
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0.  Introduction 
In April 2010, the BP’s offshore drilling rig explosion spilled crude oil in the Mexico 
Gulf  and  polluted  it  on  a  large  scale.  This  event  reminded  us  that  our  contemporaneous 
industrial societies are highly sensitive to technological hazards. Indeed, productive activities 
generate potential huge harm with large ripple effects on public health or natural resources. 
Governments  and  corporate  managers  of  risky  activities  have  to  find  effective  tradeoffs 
between natural resources preservation and economic growth.  
From an economic viewpoint, industrial accident are negative externalities that disturb 
the classical adverse selection problem of “no distortion of the top” put into evidence in the 
eighties by Maskin and Riley (1984), (Baron and Myerson (1982)), (Mussa and Rosen, 1978), 
(Myerson, 1981). These disruptions involve that the most efficient agent cannot get the first-
best outcome. The range of ex-ante and ex-post environmental regulatory instrument defined 
to overcome this problem is quite wide (see for instance (Kolstad, Uhlen and Johnson, 1991), 
(Schmitz, 2000)). Strict liability regimes are legal instruments usually implemented to protect 
the environment with twofold objectives: compensating damage and inducing managers to 
take preventive measures. Strict liability regimes share the same feature in the sense that the 
proof of any fault is unnecessary to compensate victims. Hence, liability is implied by the 
mere existence of a causal link between the risky activity and the harm, this, regardless of the 
level of care the liable agent exercised beforehand. Strict liability means that he must repair 
the entire damage he caused. Undoubtedly, this regime advantages victims that can access 
rapidly to compensation without bearing the burden of the proof. However, its main weakness 
is that redresses amount can exceed the polluter’s financial capacities and lead him to become 
judgment proof (Summers, 1983), (Shavell, 1986)). Hence, Society as a whole will endure the 
cost of the incomplete internalization process.  
In spite of this flaw, the present paper revisits the strict liability question. It considers, 
paradoxically, that putting ceilings to the total amount of repairs can induce efficient agent to 
offer a first best prevention effort.  
More precisely, this contribution compares the relative performance of two civil strict 
liability  regimes:  “standard”  strict  liability  and  “capped”  one.  Under  a  “standard”  strict 





1  scheme  or  the  Environmental  liability  directive  of  the  EU  of  2004
2,  (OECD 
2009)). Economics literature calls this case “limited” liability because of the judgment-proof 
risk (Jost, 1996), (Segerson and Tietenberg, 1992.). In the opposite, the Law puts ceiling on 
the level of repairs in the so-called “capped” strict liability regimes (as in the maritime sector 
for oil pollution or in the electro-nuclear industry). This is also a limited liability case but 
polluters’ financial resources are preserved. 
To deal with the judgment-proof question two options may be considered. The main 
one shifts the liability burden to vicarious or solvent third parties. Following Shavell (1986), 
authors as Pitchford (1995), Boyer and Laffont (1997) or still Heyes (1996) initiated a huge 
literature that studies vicarious liability under ex-post liability rules. Recently, Hiriart and 
Martimort (2006)) opened this field to criminal liability by combining fines and rewards. 
Boyer and Porrini (2006) (2008) explore the relationships of banks and firms under tort law 
where the decision of the court is random.  
Without contesting these views, the present paper explores the much less crowded 
second option. Boyd and Ingberman (1994), Dari-Mattiacci (2006) extend the Beard (1991)’s 
contribution to cap strict liability. They show that capping the repairs amount may induce 
firms to increase their prevention effort and, then, contribute to improve the social welfare 
that  standard  strict  liability  struggles  to  meet.  Basically,  our  model  assumes  double 
asymmetric information: first, the efficiency in  providing safety and, second, the level of 
wealth between the principal and the agent. Capping strict liability induces the efficient agents 
to supply the first best solution of the symmetric information under standard strict liability 
and, this, at the price of a minimized informational rent.  
A first paragraph presents some examples of sectors ruled by capped strict liability. 
These are mainly the maritime and the electro-nuclear sectors. We will discuss there much 
more analytically the previous contributions. In a second paragraph, the basic features of the 
model are given. The first rank level of safety effort under symmetric information for standard 
strict liability regime is defined. A third paragraph shows that information asymmetry breaks 
this  scheme  because  efficient  agents  are  deterred  to  accept  the  delegation.  In  a  fourth 
                                                 
1 Since the early 80’s, the US Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 
Liability Act (CERCLA) and created a Superfund for cleaning-up dangerous waste sites, (see Roman (2008)). 
2 Directive 2004/35/CE of the European parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on environmental 
liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage, Official Journal of the European 




paragraph,  capped  liability  is  introduced  and  we  study  how  first  rank  level  of  effort  is 
supplied by the most efficient agent. A fifth paragraph concludes. 
1.  Some  considerations  about  the  institutional  capping  of  strict 
liability 
Both  the  maritime  sector  and  the  electro-nuclear  industry  are  regulated  by  strict 
liability regimes. The International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Bunker Oil 
Pollution Damage of 2001 states the strict liability of ship-owners for all types of pollution 
damage caused by bunker oil. However, this liability is subject to the limits of applicable 
national or international regimes not exceeding an amount calculated in accordance with the 
amended 1976 Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims. Concerning the 
maritime  transport,  compensation  for  oil  pollution  is  regulated  by  the  International 
Convention  on  Civil  Liability  for  Oil  Pollution  (CLC)  and  the  International  Convention 
setting up. The Oil Pollution Compensation Fund (Fund Convention) establishes a two-tier 
liability system built upon the (limited) strict liability for the ship owner and a collectively 
financed fund which provides supplementary compensation to victims of oil pollution damage 
who have not obtained full compensation. This notion of full compensation does not apply to 
the environment as a whole, but to people privately concerned by personal losses in a civil 
strict liability regulation context. 
After the Exxon Valdez disaster, the USA adopted the 1990 Oil Pollution Liability and 
Compensation Act. It states the ability to collect from companies for natural-resource damage 
and gives victims the right to make claims directly to the company. All claims for damages 
made under the 1990 act are capped at $75 million. The law also set up a trust fund to pay 
claims companies involved in oil spills decline to pay. However, after the Deepwater Horizon 
rig  explosion,  obviously,  this  fund  revealed  to  be  too  low  and  Democrat  senators  are 
proposing to raise the cap to $10 billion in the wake of the BP spill with a retroactive effect. 
Nowadays, the point is still at stake. 
The  nuclear  civil  liability  is  essentially  ruled  by  international  conventions
3.  They 
establish  a  strict  liability  regime  channeled  exclusively  to  the  operators  of  the  nuclear 
                                                 
3 IAEA's Vienna Convention of 1963, OECE’s Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear 
Energy  of  1960  and  the  Convention  on  Supplementary  Compensation  for  Nuclear  Damage  (CSC)  of  1997 




installations.  If  this  liability  is  absolute,  it  is  limited  in  time  and  amount  which  is  set  to 
€1.500M (see World Nuclear Association 2009). 
Hence, the liable agent is exposed to a level of redress substantially lower than the 
amount of the harm. This lightened responsibility should act as an investment incentive for 
firms. For instance, developing nuclear industry involves relieving nuclear operators of the 
burden  of  potentially  ruinous  liability  claims
4.  However,  under  the  ceiling  of  repairs,  the 
internalization  process  remains  structurally  incomplete  because  the  victims’  rights  to  full 
compensation
5 are seriously impaired. Let us note that capped strict liability does not preclude 
individuals  from  making  other  claims  (civil  claims  that  the  company  was  negligence  or 
malfeasant).  
Some authors consider that this regime induces operators to lower their safety effort 
(Faure and Hu, 2006), (Faure and Wang, 2008)) because they proportionate it to the level of 
redress. At a political level, this analysis is echoed by opponents to the introduction of such 
liability regimes
6. However, some authors consider that limiting the amount of the polluters’ 
repair may induce them to increase the safety level beyond an optimal level, (Beard 1990), 
(Miceli and Segerson, 2003), (Dari-Mattiacci, 2006). For instance, this author insists on the 
tradeoff between the cost of precaution and the amount of wealth dedicated to redress. The 
liability caps are independent from the injurer’s safety expenditures that can contribute to 
limit excessive precaution and reduce the insolvency risk. Hence, a potential insolvent agent 
may be induced to take too much precaution compared to the social optimum. This increases 
the  total  social  costs  of  accident:  the  more  is  spent  on  prevention,  the  less  for  repairs. 
Bounding the liability allows the injurers to spare more for compensation (Dari-Mattiacci, 
2006). When they consider the social optimum, these articles do not take into consideration 
potential victims and limit it to the polluter’s welfare. In the present paper, potential victims 
are considered through the principal that acts as their representative. Hence, the question of 
                                                 
4  More explicit still is The “Exposé des Motifs” for the 1960 Paris Convention that considers that “unlimited 
liability  could  easily  lead  to  the  ruin  of  the  operator  without  affording  any  substantial  contribution  to 
compensation for the damage caused” (Exposé des Motifs, Motif 45) or still (Schwartz, 2006:39) 
5 See for instance (Boyd 2001, p.47):” On the other hand, these benefits to regulated industries must be weighed 
against  the  obvious  drawback  of  capped  liability:  namely,  that  environmental  costs  above  the  cap  will  be 
uncompensated by responsible parties.” 
6 In India, for instance, the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (CNDP), in its Appeal against the 
Proposed Civil Nuclear Liability [Cap] Bill ask the Indian government to increase the level safety considering 
the choice for the nuclear energy industry.  In http://www.sacw.net/article1288.html. See also (Anderson and 




the “under investment” or the “over-investment” in safety does not arise in the same terms. In 
the opposite, in the following we show that this kind of regime can improve the situation of 
both agents and the representative of the Society (The principal).  
2. Economic environment: technology, preferences, information 
This  paper  borrows  the  methodology  of  asymmetric  information  theory.  However, 
basically, it rests on the foundations of liability theory developed by Shavell (1986). Indeed, 
we consider that agents focus on safety level mainly. That means that reference to the quantity 
supply question is only implicit. Indeed, we consider that agents differ only by the marginal 
costs of their safety effort. That means that regarding quantities, the principal considers that 
the marginal production costs of gross production are almost identical. Putting it otherwise, 
production technologies are roughly similar but differ mainly by the level of care brought by 
the  agent.  Hence,  the  RA  knows  that  agents  compete  about  safety  which  is  reflected  in 
differentiated  marginal  costs.  This  state  of  matter  is  a  common  feature  considering  most 
modern  products  and  production  because  knowledge  about  basic  technology  is  available 
everywhere. For instance, if cars have similar basic structure, however, brands differ in their 
specific  embedded  equipment  about  safety  or  quality  (see  for  instance,  (Gabszewicz,  and 
Thisse,1979), (Tirole,1988, chap.7), (Tay 2003), (Toshimitsu and Jinji, 2007). Every Nation 
knows how to produce basic cars, but only few among them can control safety equipments. 
This observation extends for most goods or services as, for instance, nuclear power plants or 
delegated water services. Nowadays, for most products and production, competition bears 
more on quality than on the question of quantity. 
Consequently, in order to assess a relevant level of transfers to pay for safety (as an 
embedded part of the total price) the principal has to observe the level of care effort. Let us 
explain the point. Most of risky activities are under the supervision of authorities or State 
Agencies. They give permits and administrative authorizations to operators that deal with 
dangerous activities (chemical plants, electro-nuclear production, waste treatment, etc.). That 
involves that the quality and the safety of the products have to be checked up regularly. For 
instance, regular inspections may verify the safety of facilities, the existence of installations 
etc. This may be assimilated to the checking of the level of the safety effort  . However, the 
Principal or the RA cannot appreciate the effective efficiency of the agent when managing 




spill, had suffered a leak in the weeks leading up to the blast. This leak has been insufficiently 
appreciated by the BP’s management. Tad Patzek (2010) considers that the problem is deeper 
than  a  simple  monitoring  question  and  involves  the  necessary  revision  of  the  whole 
production structure. Difference in marginal costs in safety indicates the degree of skill of the 
agent and this is private information. Let us come again to the question of cars. Everybody 
can compare and even check the set of safety equipments from a brand to another one and can 
accept to pay more or less according the sophistication degree of a model. However, it is 
difficult to appreciate the effective producer’s skill for a specific car model. This is the root of 
asymmetric  information  in  our  model.  Hence,  if  the  principal  can  accede  to  the  level  of 
agents’ safety effort, he cannot appreciate their effective skill. The more efficient an agent is, 
the lowest his safety marginal costs.   
2.1 General feature of the model 
A Regulatory Agency (RA) or Principal wants to delegate to the private sector the 
production of a public good. This activity can induce severe harm to the Environment and/or 
public Health. Besides the product, the RA needs also an optimal safety level (for instance 
good  water  quality  or  safe  electro-nuclear  power,  or  still  good  conditions  for  oil 
transportation.).  The  Principal  derives  a  benefit        from  the  acquisition  of  the  good 
provided that it ensures an adequate level of security e.      is defined on ℝ with   
  > 0 and 
   
   > 0.  Furthermore,  this  function  satisfies  the  Inada  condition:   ′ 0  → +∞  and 
lim →   ′     = 0. 
We will analyze respectively both regimes the strict liability one and the capped one. 
The last one puts ceilings of the level of repairs. Let   be the level of the agent’s wealth, and 
  the level of damage (where   <  ) if major accident occurs. Hence, the damage costs 
exceed the  agent’s  financial capacities. Under  a standard liability regime, if a benevolent 
Court considers the agent as liable, he will have to pay on his own assets. However, if his 
wealth is insufficient for full repairs, he becomes judgment proof (Summers, 1983), (Shavell, 
1986)). Under a capped liability scheme, the amount of damage is fixed to  , where   <   
and  liable agents escape the judgment-proof situation. The potential damage   of the activity 
is common knowledge as the probability distribution of the environmental harm      where 
  
  < 0 and    
   > 0. 
Informational asymmetries are two: i) the level of safety effort and ii) the agent’s 




liability  and  competition,  as  (Pitchford,  1995),  (Laffont  and  Boyer  (1997),  (Boyd  and 
Ingerman, 1997), (Hiriart and Martimort, 2006), we dissociate the level of safety effort from 
the efficiency about the skill of the firm in its management of safety.   
2.1.1 The utility functions of the RA and the Agent 
When the RA acquires the public good, he requires also a given level of safety and the 
RA’s utility function is: 
   =      −             [1] 
Where,   is the payment made to the agent by the RA,   has to be high enough to cover 
the costs induced by the production activity and the safety effort. If   is the profit function of 
the agent: 
  =   −    ,            [2] 
This writing means that the agent assesses both cost of safety and he has to internalize 
the possible damage to the environment       where   = { , } is the amount of the redress 
under a capped strict liability regime for a fixed amount   and a   (the amount of his wealth) 
for a “standard” strict liability. The value   stands for the marginal cost of safety efforts made 
by the agent where    ∈   ,   with   (respectively  ) the marginal safety effort cost of the 
efficient  (resp.  inefficient)  agent).  As  agent’s  efficiency  is  private  information,  the  RA 
assesses the following probability distribution on the distribution between efficient agent (ϑ  
and inefficient ones (1 − ϑ), ( 1 ≥ ϑ ≥ 0). 
We can define the firm’s cost function considering the possibility of the occurrence of 
a severe accident (probability     ). The expected cost of safety writes now: 
   , ,   =     1 −       +     +               [3] 
Or, after developing: 
   , ,   =    +                   [4] 
 For   ∈   ,   and   = { , } 
And the profit function becomes: 
  =   −    , ,   =   −    −               [5] 
We deduce the society’s welfare function: 
   = U + V =      −     −       for   ∈   ,  7       [6] 
                                                 




We  can  notice  that  this  function  is  such  that       > 0,     "    > 0,  this 
because      > 0,  > 0           > 0. As for standard asymmetric information theory we 
can define the contracting outcome: the relevant variables are the level of effort   necessary to 
achieve an acceptable level of safety and the transfer   received by the agentt. Let Ξ the set of 
feasible allocations that is given by: 
  =    ,  :  ∈ ℝ  ,  ∈ ℝ ,  
These  variables  are  both  observable  and  verifiable  by  a  third  party  such  as  a 
benevolent court of law. Hence, the effective informational asymmetries are the agent’s level 
of  wealth  and  his  efficiency  level  of  safety.  This  extends  the  models  of  Shavell  (1984), 
(1986), (1987) or Landes and Posner (1989) to informational asymmetries. 
2.1.2 The Complete Information Optimal Contract 
a) The first-best safety level  
We assume first that there is no information asymmetry between the principal and the 
agent (either in efficiency or in wealth). Then, the RA can perform an appropriate transfer. 
The  efficient  care  levels  are  obtained  by  equating  the  principal’s  marginal  value  and  the 
agent’s marginal cost. Hence, we have the following first-order conditions from [6]: 
    ∗  =   +  ′  ∗              [7] 
And, 
    
∗  =   +  ′  
∗              [8] 
The complete information efficient safety level  ∗ and ℎ
∗
 should be carried out if their 
social values, respectively  ∗ =    ∗  −    ∗ −    ∗   and  
∗
=    
∗  −   
∗ −    
∗   
are non-negative. We can settle proposition 1 
Proposition 1: If   ∗ =    ∗  −    ∗ −    ∗   and  
∗
=    
∗  −   
∗ −    
∗   
are non-negative, then: 
   ∗  −    ∗ −    ∗   ≥    
∗  −   
∗ −    
∗   ≥    
∗  −   
∗ −    
∗    [9] 
(Proof in appendix). 
This relationship involves that the social value of the protection level is higher when 
the agent is efficient than when it is not.  
b) Implementing the first-best 
For a successful delegation of the task, the principal has to offer the agent a utility 




the agent’s participation constraints. Then, the quo-utility level or participation constraints 
write as: 
  −     −       ≥ 0           [10] 
  −   ̅ −    ̅     ≥ 0           [11] 
To implement the first-best production levels, the principal makes a contract of a take-




∗ -contract for the inefficient one    . Hence, under symmetric information assumption, 
the  principal  needs  to  know  perfectly  the  agent’s  wealth  level  to  perform  an  appropriate 
payment. Indeed, the transfer   includes both the safety price and the risk cover.  
3.  Asymmetric  information  and  information  rents:  the  case  of 
standard strict liability 
Now, we analyze the situation characterized by information asymmetries (efficiency 
and wealth) between the RA and the agent in a standard strict liability framework. Hence, if 
he is found liable for the harm, the agent will have to repair it by engaging the whole of his 
assets. 
3.1 The agent program under standard strict liability 
The agent knows privately both how efficient he is and his wealth level. These values 
are ignored by the principal. Then, he has to design an incentive mechanism that will reveal 
this  double  information.  Conform  to  standard  asymmetric  information  theory  (Laffont-
Martimort, 2002, chap.2)), a menu of contracts   =    ,  ,  ,     is incentive compatible 
when   ,   is weakly preferred to   ,   by the agent   and    ,   is weakly preferred to   ,   
by  the  agent   .  This  involves  that  the  following  constraints  (incentive  compatibility 
constraints) have to be respected: 
  −     , ,   ≧   −    , ,          [12] 
  −    , ,   ≧   −    , ,          [13] 
A supplementary condition is that participation constraints have to be respected too: 
  −     , ,   ≧  0             [14] 




The menu of contracts is incentive feasible if the constraints [12] to [15] are satisfied. 
Contracts in   are truthful, i.e. the firm is induced to report its true technological parameters. 
We define the information rents of the agent of each type as: 
  =   −     , ,             [16] 
  =   −    , ,            [17] 
Then we can define the amount that an efficient agent can capture by mimicking an 
inefficient agent. However, the risk question makes this point more delicate. Hence, if the 
efficient agent can mimic the   agent by adapting its supply of security service, a priori, he 
cannot imitate the   agent’s level of wealth   which is unknown to him... Furthermore, in the 
case  of  an  accident,  his  effective  wealth  will  be  engaged.  Hence,  the  informational  rent 
depends only on the level of supplied safety which expresses as: 
  =   −     , ,   ≧   −      , ,  . 
Or, still: 
  =   −    , ,   −     ,   +    , ,   =   −     +         +    ̅ −      ̅   
  =   −     ,   ≧   + ∆   − ∆              [18] 
(Where ∆  =   −   > 0 and ∆  =   −  ). 
Let  us  note  one  cannot  know  a  priori  if  the  wealth  difference  ∆   is  positive  or 
negative.  Indeed,  we  cannot  postulate  that  the  efficient  agent  has  to  be  richer  than  the 
inefficient one or the reverse. The consequences of both designs have to be discussed. 
3.2 The program of the principal under standard strict liability 
To  overcome  the  uncertainty  induced  by  informational  asymmetries,  the  principal 
offers a menu of contracts. Before defining his complete program, we have to define the 
regulator’s expected gain which expresses as:  
      −    1 −       +       −   −    −         =      −    −        −      
Then, taking into account the nature of the agent, the principal’s program writes as: 
      ,  ,  ,            −    −        −     +  1 −         −    −        −        [19] 
Subject to the constraints [12] to [15]. 
Considering the information rents   =   −     , ,   and   =   −    , ,  . 
 We can replace the value of the transfers by the information rents, and, then, the 




      ,  ,  ,          −     −         + 
 1 −         −     −        –     +  1 −      [20] 
Subject to the incentive constraints: 
  ≧   + ∆   − ∆               [12’] 
  ≧    − ∆   + ∆                [13’] 
And the participation constraints: 
  ≧ 0                [14’] 
  ≧ 0                [15’] 
The principal aims first at maximizing the net safety surplus and, second, minimizing 
the information rents. In general, following standard presentation (Laffont-Martimort, 2002), 
finding solution to this program involves choosing the relevant constraints, i.e. the binding 
ones  at  the  optimum.  Hence,  the  relevant  constraints  are  reduced  from  four  to  two:  the 
incentive constraint of the efficient agent and the participation constraint of the   agent. Now, 
taking  into  account  the  severe  accident  occurrence,  this  simplification  has  to  be  made 
cautiously  because  the  agent’s  wealth  is  privately  known  and  this  adds  a  supplementary 
uncertainty.  
Proposition 2: Considering standard strict liability regime, when the probability of 
severe  accident  with  social  impact  (health  or  environment)  is  introduced,  the  revelation 
mechanism depends on the wealth of each category’s of agent. Considering the program [20] 
to[15’], the necessary condition for solving it is that    >  . 
(Proof in appendix). 
This proposition means that when the inefficient agent is richer than the efficient one, 
then the usual mechanism that involves that efficient agent will supply the first best level of 
effort does not work anymore. Indeed, [15’] (  ≧ 0) cannot be respected (this value can be 
negative). The efficient agent ignores if his assets are higher than the ones of the inefficient 
agent and he is deterred to participate.   
If   >  , (proposition 2 fulfilled), the remaining relevant constraints are [12’], and 
[15’], and both of them have to be binding. Consequently:   
  = ∆   − ∆                    [12’’] 
And, 
  = 0                [15’’] 




       ,         −     −        +  1 −         −    −       –   ∆   − ∆       [20’] 
From the analysis of the first order conditions, we deduce the informational rents that 
the efficient agent can capture. Indeed, if the inefficient agent gets no rent by mimicking the   
agent, the efficient agent may acquire information rent. We note by “SB” the second best 
optimal values. The first order conditions are given by: 
        =   +   ′               [21] 
This corresponds to the first best value of   and    = ∗. The informational rent of the 
principal is then equal to   = ∆  
   − ∆    
   . Concerning the inefficient agent:  
 1 −        
    −   −       
     =    ∆  − ∆     
    -     
  [22] 
 [22]  expresses  the  tradeoff  between  efficiency  and  rent  extraction.  Here    ∆  −
∆     
     > 0 because     
    < 0, ∆  > 0 and ∆ >0. The question is to know if this 
condition is compatible with the monotonicity condition that can be deduced from [12’] and 
[13’]. It appears from them that: 
0 ≧ ∆   
   −      − ∆     
    −         
By  assumption  ∆  > 0,     
    −       >0  because     = ∗  hence  ∆     
    −
        > 0 and − ∆     
    −         < 0 . Furthermore, ∆  > 0 and  
   −     < 0, 
then the proposition is verified and we get the following relationship: 
 ∗ =     >  
∗ >  
               [23] 
Now we can determine the level of the second best transfers taking into account the 
information rents. For that, we recall that from the definition of the information rent: 
    =     −     ,    =∆  
   − ∆    
    
Then,      −     −        = ∆  
   − ∆    
          [24] 
As a consequence: 
    =    ∗ +      ∗  + ∆  
   − ∆    




=    
   +      
             [26] 
These results differ slightly with standard asymmetric information theory. They call 




Remark  1:  It  is  legitimate  to  consider  that  ∆  =   −   > 0,  that  expresses  the 
difference in efficiency of agent   compared to agent   considering marginal costs. However, 
there is no economic legitimacy putting ∆  =   −   > 0 (or the reverse) as an assumption. 
Proposition 2 results from a strong assumption. However, in general, there is no economic 
reason to consider that the efficient agent should be richer than the inefficient one or the 
reverse.  
Remark 2: We can check that the informational rent of the efficient agent is positive 
only if:    ∗  >  1 −
 
     
      with  1 >
 
  > 0  (proof in appendix);  
If this condition is not met, then the value of the informational rent can be weak. 
Concretely,  this  condition  means  that  the  difference  between  the  efforts  brought  by  the 
efficient agent compared to the inefficient one, has to be higher than 
 
     
   . 
Remark 3: Under a standard strict liability regime under an asymmetric information 
assumption, the efficient agents may be deterred to enter in the game. Indeed, two conditions 
have  to  be  met  to  induce  him  to  compete.  The  first  one  is  necessary  but  insufficient 
(proposition 1) i.e. his level of wealth has to be higher than the one of the inefficient agent. 
The other condition, (sufficient) is that the level of safety effort has to be high enough such 
that the difference in the probability of accident will exceed  
 
     
   .  
We have to underline that this condition is particularly stringent because the efficient 
agent must know too much information before accepting the delegation. Indeed, the efficient 
agent cannot know the nature of his opponent’s wealth.    
Remark 4: The constraint [13’] (  ≧    − ∆   + ∆     ) means that the inefficient 
agent claims that he is efficient but he will fail to supply the promised level of safety. This is 
typically  an  adverse  selection  problem.  However,  it  cannot  be  solved  here  because 
instruments that could induce the efficient agent to overcome his reluctance to produce when 
conditions are not favorable are lacking.  
As a conclusion, standard strict liability is not a powerful instrument to protect public 
health and the environment. This result has long been known (Shavell, 1986)) and asymmetric 
information reinforce the point. We show furthermore that uncertainty  about wealth level 
under this regime tends to favor the adverse selection effect. This state of matter introduces 




4.  The Capped strict liability scheme and asymmetric information 
In this paragraph two points will be discussed: first, the way to  get an acceptable 
solution for the strict liability scheme and second, the consequences for a better involving of 
associated financing institution. Hence capped liability allow to secure investment and makes 
easier insuring investment.  
4.1 A solution for the ceiling of liability 
Now we make the assumption that Law limits the amount of repairs. The ceiling of 
damages should preserve the wealth of the agent:   <   <  ,   > 0. This induces to modify 
generically the cost function as: 
    , ,   =    +                 [27] 
As previously, the informational rent expresses as: 
   =   −     , ,   ≧   −      , ,          [28] 
And, processing as before when we got equation [18]: 
   ≧  
 
+ ∆          [29] 
(Where the index   to    and  
 
indicates that the new liability regime is capped strict 





=   −    , ,   ≧    − ∆            [30] 
The principal’s program becomes now (simplification in the appendix) (Program PC): 
   
    ,  ,  
 
,          −     −         +  1 −         −     −        −      + 




   ≧  
 
+ ∆              [32] 
 
 
≧    − ∆              [33] 
   ≧ 0              [34] 
 
 
≧ 0              [35] 
As  previously,  we  have  to  define  which  are  the  relevant  constraints  among  the 
incentive compatibility and participation constraints. Relevancy means the binding ones at the 
optimum level. We consider contracts without collapse, i.e.   > 0. This is verified when the 
Inada condition  ′ 0  → +∞ is satisfied and lim →   ′     = 0. The participation constraint 




context, the inefficient agent has no interest mimicking efficiency, then [33] is irrelevant. 
After this simplification, two constraints are remaining the   -agent’s incentive compatible 
constraint [32] and the participation constraint of the   -agent [35]. Getting the optimum of 
the PC program involves that both constraint must be binding:  




= 0              [37] 
This reduces the objective function of the program (PC) becomes: 
     ,          −     −         +  1 −         −     −         −   ∆   [38] 
As  in  standard  representations,  asymmetric  information  modifies  the  principal’s 
optimization by the subtraction of the expected rent that has to be given up to the   agent. 
This rent depends on the level of effort requested from the inefficient type. From the first 
order conditions we draw the equilibrium values which are identical to the full information 
setting for the efficient agent.  
        =   +   ′     ,          [39] 
And for the inefficient one: 
 ′  
    −    = 
 
     ∆           [40] 
We can check that with a similar argument made for the standard liability scheme we 
define  the  following  relationship  that  follows  from  the  monotonicity  of  the  second-best 
schedule of safety level: 
 ∗ =     >  
∗ >  
               [41] 
(Where ("."     stands for the second best under the capped regime). In summary, we 
can draw the following proposition: 
Proposition 3: Under asymmetric information, under a cap strict liability regime, the 
optimal contracts entail: 
-  No  safety  effort  distortion  for  the     agent  in  respect  to  the  first  best 
 ∗ =     and a downward distortion for the   type, gives: 
     ′  
    −    = 
 
     ∆ , with  
∗ >  
   . 
-  Only the efficient  type gets a positive information rent given by: 
    = ∆                [42] 
-  The second best transfers are respectively: 
    =    ∗ +     ∗  + ∆  







=   ̅ +      
              [44] 
(Proof is deduced from the previous argument).  
The ceiling of liability allows dropping the unknown level of wealth. Indeed, by [29] 
and [30] the value of the ceiling replaces the agent’s wealth. Hence, the problem reduces to 
only one private information variable: the safety effort efficiency. The result that follows is 
quite standard. Under the ceiling of redress, the level of precautionary  effort of the most 
efficient  agent  corresponds  to  the  first  rank  of  the  symmetric  information  scheme.  The 
counterpart is that this agent benefits of an informational rent that, however, is minimized by 
the optimal contract between the RA and the efficient agent. 
4.2 Capped liability and insurance: an introduction 
Conversely to a well shared opinion, the above results show that ceiling the redress 
level leads neither to overinvest in safety effort nor to under-invest in it if the principal can 
impact on the level of safety. Under asymmetric information, putting caps on redress issues 
on the same level of effort than the delegation of the risky activity under both symmetric 
information and the standard strict liability regime. After this initial result, many avenues 
must  be  explored.  For  instance,  we  have  not  addressed  the  issue  of  insurance  which  for 
capped liability is an important matter (Shavell, 2005), (Boyd and  Ingerman, 1997)).  For 
instance, it is compulsory for oil operators in the maritime sector and the nuclear industry to 
subscribe insurance against technological risk. In this paper, we have limited our concern to 
study the scope and power of the ex-post regulatory control based on the ceiling of redress 
under informational asymmetries on agent’s wealth and efficiency.  
By fixing the ceiling of the redress, the RA reduces the uncertainty involved by the 
unknown wealth of polluters. Furthermore, the RA can control the agent’s activity by by 
demanding that candidates to delegation should own at least the amount of the cap as financial 
guarantee. This induces insufficient funded agents to withdraw. This may be done either on 
the own assets of the agent or by the help of an insuring company. For instance, if Q is that 
level that is insured, where: 
  −   =   (  is this share of the agent’s wealth which is used as commitment). As a 
consequence, the agent has to cope with two principals: the RA and the insurance company. 
Indeed, we can consider that the insurance premium is equivalent to       =  , that is to say 
the probability of an accident by the claim of the company. As a result, to reduce his premium 




the level of safety corresponds to the level of the insurance premium. A next step will be to 
develop these relationships. 
5.  Conclusion 
Under asymmetric information, standard strict liability rules fail to provide the first 
best level of safety effort. This favors adverse selection emergence and can induce inefficient 
firms to undertake risky activities by deterring the efficient ones. Capped strict liability may 
be an alternative to strict liability. However, this switching does not guarantee automatically 
restoring efficiency. Indeed, some necessary conditions have to be fulfilled.  
In real life, as far as informed people perceive that the ceiling is insufficient, capped 
strict  liability  raise  strong  opposition.  In  this  paper  we  showed  that,  under  asymmetric 
information, the Principal has to formulate relevant contracts that put together caps and level 
of safety effort. These contracts are second best contracts compared to the certain case under 
strict liability, but they adjust the level of safety to the level of the cap. At the equilibrium 
level, the level of care has to be chosen such that the marginal costs of care are offset by 
marginal  reductions  in  expected  damages.  To  be  fully  efficient,  a  capped  strict  liability 
scheme needs to associate the utility level of the principal to a relevant level of security. This 
involves establishing a tradeoff between a relevant safety effort and its associated costs and 
the level of redress designed by the level of the cap. Indeed, this tradeoff balances the risk 
level that the principal can accept and the amount of the fund dedicated to repairs.  
Capping the repairs level does not remove the judgment-proof question even if an 
efficient contract is formulated. However, it locks up the debate by explicitly involving all the 
parties. Hence, at the equilibrium, implicitly, the principal accepts incomplete repairs but the 
potential loss is balanced by an increase in safety. These one consists in two points. First, the 
equilibrium level of effort is calculated on the whole cost of damage that the society can 
endure.  The  effort  level  is  identical  to  the  one  of  the  certainty  case  reached  under  strict 
liability.  Second,  the  contract  attracts  the  safety  efficient  agent  and  avoids  the  adverse 
selection  effect.  This  eviction  effect  of  safety  inefficient  agent  can  be  reinforced  by  the 
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The society welfare function:  
  =      1 −       +       −    −         −       ⟹ 
  =      1 −       +       −    −         −     −       =  
  =      −     −       for   ∈   ,   and   = { , }. 
Proof of proposition 1 
To see this point we note that because,      <      , then 
    ∗   −    
∗   < 0, and    ∗  −    ∗ > 0,    
∗  −   
∗ > 0 and  
   ∗  −    ∗ ≥    
∗  −   
∗ ≥    
∗  −   
∗, is verified then,  
   ∗  −    ∗ −    ∗   ≥    
∗  −   
∗ −    
∗   ≥    
∗  −   
∗ −    
∗    is 
verified too.  
Proof of proposition 2 
Hence, having   ≧ 0 [14’] cannot be considered as granted. Preliminary conditions 
have to be formulated.   ≧ 0 means that if   ≧ 0 is binding (   = 0) then this involves that: 
   = ∆   − ∆      ≧ 0 or, still, ∆  ∆  ⁄ ≧        ⁄ , by definition        ⁄ > 0 (with 
       → 0 ⁄ ), furthermore, by definition, ∆  > 0 then, the condition for having ∆  ∆  ⁄ > 0 is 
that ∆  > 0 i.e.   >   because ∆  > 0. Hence, the condition for having   ≧ 0 is that   >  . 
That means that if the efficient agent is less rich than the inefficient one, then the participation 
constraint cannot be fulfilled. 
 
Proof of remark 2 
Starting from  
    =    ∗ +      ∗  + ∆  
   − ∆    
    
We study the conditions for which: 
      ∗  − ∆    
    ≥ 0 or still      ∗  −    −      
    ≥ 0, under the respect of 
proposition 2, the results ensues: 
   ∗  >  1 −
 
     
   . 
Getting the program  
      ,  ,  ,            −    −        −     +  1 −         −    −        −      
Subject the constraints of incentive compatibility: 
  −     −       ≧   −     −        
  −    ,   ≧   −    ,    
And  the  supplementary  condition  of  the  participation  constraints  that  have  to  be 
respected too: 
  −     −       ≧  0  
  −   ̅ −      ̅  ≧ 0  
As previously, we can cancel the transfers  ,   and replacing them by the informational 
rents, we get the PC program.  
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